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DIRECT SOCIAL PERCEPTION OF 
EMOTIONS IN CLOSE RELATIONS1
abstract
Drawing on a pluralist approach to mindreading, I explore Direct Social Perception with respect to 
perceiving the emotional states of people that we are close to, such as spouses, friends, and family. I argue 
that in general, emotions are embodied and can be perceived directly. I further claim that perceptual 
content includes concepts. That is, I argue against a non-conceptual view of emotion recognition, 
claiming instead that we learn emotional concepts by attending to certain expressive patterns of 
emotions. This view implicates that we can directly perceive both basic and non-basic emotions of people 
we are close to.
keywords
direct social perception, embodied emotions, mindreading, pattern recognition
ANDREA BLOMQVIST 
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DIRECT SOCIAL PERCEPTION OF EMOTIONS IN CLOSE RELATIONS
Direct Social Perception (DSP) is the idea that we can directly perceive others mental states.1 
Proponents of DSP claim that some mental states  usually motor intentions and emotions, 
but also sometimes beliefs (Gallagher and Hutto, 2008)  are embodied, and can therefore be 
directly accessed by others using perception (Gallagher, 2008; Gallagher, 2015; Krueger and 
Overgaard, 2012; Newen, Welpinghus, and Juckel, 2015; Spaulding, 2015; Zahavi, 2011). This 
paper will exclusively deal with emotions  in particular the non-basic emotions2 of people 
that we know well. 
DSP is often contrasted with inferentialist mindreading theories such as Theory Theory (TT) 
and Simulation Theory (ST).3 Both of these theories claim that others mental states are hidden 
from us; we need to use a theory or simulation to gain access to others mental states, and we 
can only non-inferentially gain access to our own mental states. According to TT, we do this by 
using folk psychological rules such as if A wants p and believes that doing q will bring about 
p, then ceteris paribus, A will do q (Borg, 2007). When observing someone reaching for a 
bottle, I attribute the desire that they want the bottle to them, and the belief that reaching for 
it is the best way of achieving their goal. Similarly, if I observe someone smiling as they greet 
a friend, I may attribute happiness to them. Thus, by observing behavior, I infer that an agent 
has certain mental states. According to ST, we understand others mental states by simulating 
WKHLUHPRWLRQVRUWKRXJKWVRIÁLQHLQRXUVHOYHVDQGWKHQSURMHFWLQJWKHVLPXODWHGVWDWHWR
them (Goldman, 2006). That is, we put ourselves in their shoes to understand them.
In this paper, I will argue for a pluralist approach to mindreading.4 That is, rather than 
claiming that the above theories are incompatible, I will claim that we use different strategies 
in different contexts depending on which is the least effortful to use (Fiebich and Coltheart, 
1  I am grateful to Will Hornett who on numerous occasions gave me insightful feedback on my manuscript as well 
DVWRRNWLPHWRGLVFXVVLWZLWKPH²WKLVVLJQLÀFDQWO\LPSURYHGWKHSDSHU,DPDOVRJUDWHIXOWRP\VXSHUYLVRU/XFD
Barlassina and the two anonymous referees who reviewed the manuscript and provided useful comments.
2  I use non-basic and complex emotions interchangeably, where I take them to be any emotion that is not basic. 
Basic emotions include happiness, surprise, anger, sadness, fear, and disgust (Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth, 1972). 
([DPSOHVRIQRQEDVLFFRPSOH[HPRWLRQVDUHMHDORXV\VRUURZSULGHHWF
3  See for example Gopnik and Wellman (1992) for a defense of a version of TT, and Goldman (2006) for a defense of a 
version of ST.
4  For pluralist accounts of mindreading, see Fiebich and Coltheart (2015); Gallagher (2015); and Fiebich, Gallagher, 
and Hutto (2016).
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2015, p. 249). I will focus on the context5 of interaction in close relations and argue that we 
use DSP in face-to-face interactions with people that we know well (e.g. spouses, friends, 
family).6 My account will thus focus on interactions between people who are well acquainted, 
something which is not traditionally discussed by TT and ST (Fiebich and Coltheart, 2015, p. 
236). There is a strong reason for the mindreading literature to focus on these cases, since 
ZHDFWXDOO\VSHQGDVLJQLÀFDQWDPRXQWRIWLPHPLQGUHDGLQJSHRSOHWKDWZHDUHFORVHWR
rather than strangers (think for example about how frequently spouses interact and how 
mindreading is important for the relationship to work smoothly). In these kinds of close 
relations, I will further claim, we can not only come to perceive the basic emotions, but we 
DOVRSHUFHLYHQRQEDVLFVRPHWLPHVFDOOHG´GLVSRVLWLRQDOµHPRWLRQVVXFKDVMHDORXV\DQG
pride.7 I will argue that this is a process that is based on pattern recognition as suggested by 
Newen, Welpinghus, and Juckel (2015). However, I will depart from their view of the process as 
non-conceptual (Newen and Schlicht, 2009), and instead argue for a conceptual account based 
on Siegels theory of rich perception and Wus theory of attention (Siegel, 2006; Wu, 2008). This 
paper will thus develop an account of how we gain the ability to directly perceive non-basic 
emotional states of people we are close to. 
In Section 1, I will outline the basic claims of DSP, considering how we can come to perceive 
emotional states by perceiving embodied emotions. Following Green, I will claim that we 
can perceive a mental state by perceiving part of it (Green, 2010). In Section 2, I will argue 
that perception is rich, and that we do not only perceive low-level properties like shapes and 
colors, but we can also perceive high-level states such as emotions, provided that we possess 
the right emotional concepts (Siegel, 2006; 2010). To explain how these concepts are acquired, 
I will draw on Wus account of attention (Wu, 2008). In Section 3, I will consider Newen and 
Schlichts argument that emotion recognition is based on non-conceptual pattern recognition 
(Newen and Schlicht, 2009). Here, I will be sympathetic to the idea that pattern recognition is 
necessary for emotion recognition, but argue that this process is conceptual. I will back this 
up by empirical data showing that people with dementia have impaired emotion recognition 
because they lack emotional concepts. Finally, in Section 4, I will show how rich perception, 
attention, and pattern recognition can enable us to directly perceive the non-basic emotions 
of people that we are close to.
 
DSP theorists claim that mindreading is perceptual rather than cognitive and that we can 
directly perceive certain mental states of other people. DSP, they argue, is a non-inferential 
kind of mindreading that stands in contrast to the inferential mindreading proposed by 
theories such as TT and ST. Commonly, DSP theorists argue that we have direct access to 
the basic emotional states and motor intentions of other people (Gallagher, 2008; Gallagher, 
2015; Krueger and Overgaard, 2012; Newen, Welpinghus, and Juckel, 2015; Spaulding, 2015; 
Zahavi, 2011). On these accounts, perceiving the emotional state of another person is on a par 
 7KLVFDQEHVHHQDVDUHVSRQVHWR%RKOZKRUDLVHVWKHZRUU\IRU'63WKHRULVWVWKDWWKH\KDYHQRWVSHFLÀHGLQ
which contexts DSP rather than other mindreading strategies are used. 
 ,ZLVKWRFODULI\WZRUHDGLQJVRIWKLVVWDWHPHQWWKDW,GRQRWLQWHQG7KHÀUVWUHDGLQJLVWKDW'63LVonly used in 
close relations, and hence not used to recognize the emotions of strangers. This is false, since we can directly perceive 
basic emotions of strangers as well. The second reading is that in close relations, we only use DSP, as opposed to any 
RWKHUPLQGUHDGLQJVWUDWHJLHV$OWKRXJK,ÀQGWKLVPRUHSODXVLEOHLWLVOLNHO\WKDWZHVRPHWLPHVKDYHWRUHVRUWWRRWKHU
strategies as well, for example when we are not able to directly perceive that a partner is hurt without them saying 
so. My main claim in this paper is that we most often use DSP, as opposed to other mindreading strategies, in close 
relations. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to clarify this.
7  See Spaulding (2015) for an account of DSP whereby only occurrent basic emotions and not dispositional emotions 
are perceived. 
1. Directly 
Perceiving 
Embodied 
Emotions
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with perceiving properties such as being a table or a chair (Siegel, 2006).8 When perceiving 
WKHSURSHUW\RIEHLQJDWDEOHWKHUHLVQRH[WUDVWHSRILQIHUULQJRUMXGJLQJWKDWLWLVDWDEOH
Similarly, when I see a person smiling, I do not need to infer that they are happy. Rather, I see 
the happiness directly in their expression since the emotion is embodied in the expression. 
It is important to note that DSP is not the same as behaviorism.9 Whereas behaviorism claims 
that emotional states can be reduced to expressive states, DSP claims that expressions partly 
constitute emotional states.10 Thus, happiness cannot be reduced simply to smiling, but rather 
smiling is a constitutive part of happiness.11 Other parts include physiological responses (such 
as increased heart rate), phenomenal experience, cognitive features (such as attitudes and 
VKLIWVRIDWWHQWLRQDQGSHUFHSWLRQDQGDQLQWHQWLRQDOREMHFW1HZHQ:HOSLQJKXVDQG-XFNHO
2015: pp. 192-193).12
DSP does not need to be committed to the view that emotional expressions are necessarily 
partly constitutive of emotional states  one could be sad without crying. When this is the 
case, a pluralist theorist could claim that we cannot directly access the emotional state of the 
other person since it is not expressed, but it is still possible to access it via an inferentialist 
strategy. However, there are good reasons to think that these emotions in many cases are 
directly perceived, as there are characteristic expressions of embodied emotions that we 
readily recognize. There has been evidence showing that we can identify both emotional states 
and intentions from perceiving someones posture or the way in which an action is executed.13 
Studies have shown that we can correctly categorize emotions when seeing point-light or full-
light displays of both moving and static bodies (Atkinson et al., 2004; Heberlein et al., 2004). In a 
IXOOOLJKWGLVSOD\DQDFWRU·VERG\²EXWQRWIDFLDOH[SUHVVLRQ²LVYLVLEOHWRDVXEMHFWZKHUHDVLQ
a point-light display, the actor wears luminescent straps on selected parts of their body (such 
as wrists, shoulders and knees) such that only the straps are visible as light points. In both 
WKHVHFDVHVVXEMHFWVZHUHDEOHWRWHOOZKDWHPRWLRQWKHDFWRUZDVH[SUHVVLQJ
Further, there is a close relationship between the expression and the phenomenal experience 
of emotions, such that our emotional experiences are also affected by our expressions. This 
lends support to the idea of embodied emotions. For example, studies of people with Moebius 
syndrome support that facial expressions affect the phenomenology of emotions. Moebius 
syndrome is a congenital condition whereby a persons facial muscles are paralyzed and 
their eyes cannot move laterally. According to verbal accounts from people with Moebius 
syndrome, some feel like they liv[e] in their head and do not recognize themselves as 
feeling happy or feelingVDGEXWUDWKHUMXVWDV´WKLQN>LQJ@KDSS\RUWKLQN>LQJ@VDGµ&ROH
1998). It seems as though they do not experience the phenomenology of happiness, and part 
of the reason for this could be that they are unable to express happiness by smiling. Turning 
to how emotional states are expressed by bodily actions, studies have also found that the 
intensity of the emotional experience is reduced when people are not able to express their 
emotion using body language. This can be seen in individuals who have suffered spinal cord 
LQMXULHV&KZDOLV]et al., 1988;  Hohmann, 1966; Laird, 2007; Mack et al., 2005). Studies have also 
8  Spaulding characterizes the directness with which we perceive emotions to be on a par with how we perceive 
REMHFWVUDWKHUWKDQSURSHUWLHV6HH6SDXOGLQJS
9  See Krueger and Overgaard (2012) for an argument against DSP being a kind of behaviorism.
10  Whether or not DSP needs expressions to be partly constitutive of emotions might be a controversial issue, though 
it is usually assumed and argued for in the literature (Krueger and Overgaard, 2012). Here, I will set this issue aside 
since it is outside the scope of this paper. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention.
11  I am here using constitutive part in the same sense as Green (2010) and Krueger and Overgaard (2012).
12  I will not argue for the inclusion of these features here. For discussion, see Newen, Welpinghus, and Juckel (2015).
13  For work on decoding intentions from movement kinematics, see Ansuini et al. (2016); Cavallo et al. (2016).
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manipulated facial expressions, posture, and gestures to produce a corresponding change in 
emotional phenomenology (Davis et al., 2009; Laird, 2007; Niedenthal, 2007). These studies 
suggest that there is a causal link between the emotional expression, the physiology and the 
phenomenology of the emotion. Such a tight causal link is a good reason to think of these 
features as making up a distinct system and, as such, being constitutive parts of that system. 
We would readily take this to be the case when considering other systems, such as a computer. 
In this case, there are causal connections between the internal working parts, such that the 
activation of one will cause the activation of another, and we further take all the internal parts 
to be constitutive of the computer as a whole. Causality and partial constitution are thus not 
mutually exclusive here.
Let us now turn to the question of how we can perceive the emotion as an entity by perceiving 
one part of it. There is a worry that we cannot perceive others emotions since we cannot 
perceive the physiological or cognitive states of anothers emotion. A response to this remark 
is that we can perceive entities by perceiving characteristic parts of them (Green, 2010; 
Krueger and Overgaard, 2012). Expressions are characteristic parts of emotions, and perceiving 
DFKDUDFWHULVWLFSDUWRIDQHQWLW\LVVXIÀFLHQWIRUSHUFHLYLQJWKDWHQWLW\14 Bodily expression is 
part of an emotion, e.g. crying is part of being sad. By perceiving someone crying, we can thus 
perceive their emotional state of sadness.
There are two worries pulling in opposite directions that one might have with regards to 
SHUFHLYLQJHPRWLRQDOVWDWHVE\SHUFHLYLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLFH[SUHVVLRQV7KHÀUVWZRUU\LV
that one might think that since emotions are embodied, we should be able to perceive any 
and all emotions in anyone. This does not seem to be the case, as only basic emotions are 
perceived cross-culturally (Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth, 1972). The second worry is that 
we should only be able to perceive certain emotional states, since not all emotional states 
have characteristic expressions. Both of these worries can be resolved by clarifying what 
characteristic means. It is useful to draw a distinction between perceiving the emotions of 
strangers by perceiving characteristic expressions of basic emotions, and perceiving the non-
basic emotions of people we are close to by perceiving those particular peoples characteristic 
expressions. In the case of strangers, since we have little exposure to their expressions, we are 
only able to directly perceive basic emotions that are individuated in characteristic ways, 
e.g. smiling to express happiness. Empirical research has shown that we are able to recognize 
these expressions both within our culture and cross-culturally, lending support to the idea 
that these expressions are universal (Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth, 1972). Characteristic 
here thus refers to what is generally (or universally) characteristic of an emotion for any given 
person. With a person we are close to, however, the expression need not be characteristic of 
how people in general express the emotion, but only of how that person in particular expresses 
the emotion (this has been dubbed individual-typical expressions  Glazer, forthcoming). If I 
know a person who always expresses surprise by frowning, I will come to recognize that, for 
that person in particular, frowning is a characteristic component of surprise. How we learn 
WKLVZLOOEHFODULÀHGLQ6HFWLRQ,QWKHQH[WVHFWLRQ,ZLOODUJXHWKDWZHDOVRQHHGDYLHZRI
perceptual content as conceptually rich in order for mindreading to be a perceptual process. 
This section will focus on Siegels account of rich perceptual content, and how we come to 
acquire the concepts necessary to perceive e.g. anger as anger, UDWKHUWKDQMXVWDVDSDWWHUQRI
recognizable features. Rich perception is the idea that the content of perception is not limited 
14  I will not dwell on this point since it has been extensively discussed by Green (2010) and Krueger and Overgaard 
(2012). See these papers for more detailed arguments.
2. Rich Perception
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to representing low-level features such as shapes and colors, but is instead extended to high-
level features which can include emotions and intentions. Siegel argues that, in perception, we 
also represent properties such as (but not limited to) being a natural kind.15 Thus, we perceive 
a tiger as a tiger, rather than as a bundle of features which are inferred be a tiger. 
Siegels argument runs from the phenomenology of perception to the representational 
content of the visual phenomenal experience. Suppose that you have never seen a pine tree 
before, and are hired to cut down all the pine trees in a forest containing trees of various 
kinds. It is pointed out to you what pine trees look like. After some time, your ability to tell 
pine trees from other trees improves, and pine trees gradually become more salient to you. 
Siegel claims that there is a phenomenological difference in the visual experience before and 
after you were able to successfully pick out pine trees. This phenomenological difference is 
due to a sensory difference between the two experiences, which is in turn due to the fact that 
the two experiences differ in content. That is, the content of the visual experience before 
learning what trees are pine trees is different to the content of the visual experience after 
having learnt which trees are pine trees.16 The best explanation for this change in experience 
is that pine trees are represented as the kind pine tree when we become familiar with them. 
Since all the low-level properties, such as the color and the shape of the trees, are the same in 
both experiences, low-level representational content is not enough to explain the phenomenal 
contrast before and after acquiring the concept PINE TREE. That is, improved pattern 
recognition of low-level features is not enough to account for the different ways in which 
we experience a pine tree before we are familiar with it and after we are familiar with it; the 
concept PINE TREE needs to be acquired for the phenomenological shift to occur. I will now 
turn to the issue of how we come to recognize the pattern of features that make up a pine tree, 
since this is important for acquiring the concept.
In my view, we come to acquire the concept partly by means of becoming better at picking out 
certain features, i.e. a pattern. In order to see how emotional concepts get into the content 
of perception, I draw on Wus argument concerning the relationship between action and 
attention, and how to solve the Many-Many Problem (Wu, 2008; 2011). The Many-Many 
Problem is the problem of how we decide to perform a particular action (e.g. cutting down a 
SLQHWUHHJLYHQWKDWZHDUHÀUVWIDFHGZLWKPDQ\SHUFHSWXDOLQSXWVDQGQHHGWRGHFLGHZKLFK
are relevant to our goal, and then faced with many possible actions that can be performed to 
reach the goal. By using intention to guide attention, we can solve this problem and focus on 
the relevant perceptual features of the world in order to act in the best way possible. An agent 
PXVWÀUVWORFDWHWKHDWWHQWLRQWRVHOHFWDVSHFLÀFWDUJHWHJDJODVVWKDWWKH\ZLVKWRGULQN
IURP7KH\PXVWWKHQSDUVHWKHDWWHQWLRQWRIRFXVRQWKHVSHFLÀFSURSHUWLHVRIWKHREMHFW
that are relevant to their goal. It is not relevant whether the glass has a particular color, but 
it is relevant whether it has a handle since that renders it more pick-up-able. Wu argues that 
concepts play a role in the attentional parsing of a glass. That is, lacking the concept GLASS, 
I would not be able to attend to the features relevant for my using the glass.17 Acquiring 
the concept GLASS allows me to see the glass as a glass. There is a clear link here to Siegels 
example of seeing a pine tree as a pine tree and its features then becoming more salient. When 
it is pointed out to me what a pine tree looks like, and I have the intention of cutting down all 
pine trees, my intention can guide my attention such that certain characteristic features of 
15  See Siegel (2006; 2010) for a full defense of this argument.
16  See the literature on perceptual learning for empirical evidence supporting this thesis (e.g. Connolly, 2017).
17  Wu allows for the possibility that we can still accidentally use the glass in the right way (Wu, 2008, p. 1019).
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the pine tree become more salient to me.18 My skill of recognizing pine trees thus improves as 
I become better at picking out the pine tree pattern, allowing me to acquire the concept PINE 
TREE.
In what follows, I will give an account of the pattern recognition we, as humans, develop. I will 
consider why we should take this to be a conceptual process rather than a non-conceptual one, 
by looking at an account that holds pattern recognition to be non-conceptual.
Newen and Schlicht developed a non-conceptual account of pattern recognition of emotions, 
and Newen, Welpinghus, and Juckel argued that we recognize emotions by recognizing 
individuated patterns of emotional states (Newen and Schlicht, 2009; Newen, Welpinghus, 
and Juckel, 2015). I agree with Newen, Welpinghus, and Juckels characterization of pattern 
recognition of emotions, but I will argue that we do require the concept of e.g. anger to 
recognize the expressive pattern as anger. 
According to Newen, Welpinghus, and Juckel, emotional states are individuated as patterns 
of characteristic features. This can most easily be seen in basic emotions which are said to be 
recognized cross-culturally (Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth, 1972). Plausibly, the reason why they 
are recognized cross-culturally is because they are all individuated as patterns of characteristic 
features (which may or may not be hardwired). In any given case of pattern recognition, Newen, 
Welpinghus, and Juckel claim that a feature F (such as a facial expression) is constitutive of 
DSDWWHUQ3LILWLVSDUWRIDWOHDVWRQHVHWRIIHDWXUHVZKLFKLVPLQLPDOO\VXIÀFLHQWIRUDWRNHQ
SDWWHUQWREHORQJWRW\SH77KHPLQLPDOO\VXIÀFLHQWFRQGLWLRQVDUHWKHQMRLQWO\VXIÀFLHQWIRU
WKHHPRWLRQDOHSLVRGHWREHFODVVLÀHGDVHJWKHW\SHDQJHU,IRQHRUPRUHRIWKHVHIHDWXUHV
ZHUHUHPRYHGWKHWRNHQHPRWLRQDOHSLVRGHZRXOGQRORQJHUEHFODVVLÀHGDVRQHRIDQJHU,WLV
plausible that we are able to develop this reliable way of recognizing emotional patterns because 
we are very often exposed to these particular emotional expressions. The mechanism thus has 
a large database of expressions to draw on in order to establish the characteristic patterns of 
EDVLFHPRWLRQV,QWKHÀQDOVHFWLRQ,ZLOOVKRZKRZWKLVIHDWXUHRISDWWHUQUHFRJQLWLRQLVDOVR
important for recognizing non-basic emotions in people we are close to.
Before doing so, let us discuss why Newen and Schlichts claim that there can be a non-
FRQFHSWXDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIRWKHUV·HPRWLRQVLVWREHUHMHFWHG1HZHQDQG6FKOLFKWS
232). This understanding is supposed to be underpinned by mirror neuron processes.19 Mirror 
QHXURQVDUHQHXURQVWKDWÀUHERWKZKHQDQDFWLRQLVH[HFXWHGE\DQDJHQWDQGZKHQWKH
agent sees another executing the same action. For emotions, research has shown that the 
same brain areas are activated when a person feels disgust, as when they see someone else 
looking disgusted (Wicker et al., 2003). The thought is that we can non-conceptually perceive 
another persons emotional state using the mirror neuron system.20 However, as argued above, 
perception is a conceptual process and the understanding of emotions cannot be explained 
only in terms of non-conceptual processes. To further strengthen this point, I will show that 
VWXGLHVRQVXEMHFWVZLWKGHPHQWLDVXSSRUWWKDWFRQFHSWVDUHQHFHVVDU\ERWKIRUXVLQJREMHFWV
correctly and for recognizing emotions.21 These similarities also support my application of 
Wus account of attention to emotion recognition.
 ,PSRUWDQWO\WKHÀUVWLQWHQWLRQFDQQRWLQYROYHWKHFRQFHSW3,1(75((VLQFHWKLVKDVQRWEHHQOHDUQW\HW,QVWHDG,
suggest that the content of the intention would be something like to cut down all trees looking thusly, where thusly 
refers to whatever features ones instructor pointed out.
19  For work on mirror neurons, see Gallese et al., 1996; Iacoboni, 2005. 
20  Mirror neurons have often been taken as providing evidence in favor of Simulation Theory (Goldman and Gallese, 
1998; Goldman, 2006). Newen and Schlicht (2009) argue against this.
 :XPDNHVDVLPLODUDUJXPHQWWRVKRZWKDWFRQFHSWVDUHQHFHVVDU\IRUFRUUHFWXVHRIREMHFWV:X
3. Against Non-
Conceptual 
Recognition of 
Emotions 
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In order to possess concepts, semantic memory is needed to store these concepts. It is thus 
plausible to think that a person with impaired semantic memory would lose some of their 
FRQFHSWVDQGWKHUHIRUHQRWEHDEOHWRXVHWKHREMHFWVFRUUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHVHFRQFHSWV7KLVLV
LQGHHGWKHFDVHLQVHPDQWLFGHPHQWLDDVGHPRQVWUDWHGLQDVWXG\E\+RGJHV6XEMHFWV
ZHUHWHVWHGRQWKHLUDELOLW\WRXVHHYHU\GD\REMHFWVDVZHOODVQDPLQJWKHREMHFWVDQGDVVRFLDWLQJ
WKHPZLWKWKHLUXVHHJDFRUNVFUHZLVXVHGWRRSHQDERWWOH7RWHVWZKHWKHUWKHVXEMHFWVFRXOG
XVHWKHREMHFWVWKHVXEMHFWV·JUDVSRULHQWDWLRQDQGPRYHPHQWZHUHWHVWHG)DLOXUHWRXVHWKH
REMHFWLQDFRUUHFWPDQQHUFRUUHODWHGZLWKVHPDQWLFGLVDELOLWLHV,QH[SHULPHQWVWHVWLQJVXEMHFWV
ZLWKRXWGHPHQWLDLWKDVDOVREHHQVKRZQWKDWWKHLUJUDVSLQJRIREMHFWVLVLPSDLUHGZKHQKDYLQJ
WRGHSOR\WKHLUVHPDQWLFPHPRU\LQDGLVWUDFWRUWDVN&UHHPDQG3URIÀWW7KHFODLPWKDW
concepts are needed for emotion recognition can be supported in the same way. Studies have 
VKRZQWKDWLPSDLUHGVHPDQWLFPHPRU\DOVRKDVDQLPSDFWRQHPRWLRQUHFRJQLWLRQ6XEMHFWVZLWK
GHPHQWLDZHUHWHVWHGRQHPRWLRQUHFRJQLWLRQDQGSHUIRUPHGVLJQLÀFDQWO\ZRUVHWKDQFRQWURO
groups without dementia (Keane et al., 2002; Lavenu et al., 1999; Rosen et al., 2004 ). This supports 
that the perceiving of emotions is indeed conceptual if we are to see an emotion as a particular 
emotion. That is, in order to see sadness as sadness, an agent needs to possess the concept 
SADNESS. I still grant that there could be a non-conceptual way of registering emotions, but 
it would be wrong to call this non-conceptual understanding as Newen and Schlicht do (Newen 
and Schlicht, 2009, p. 234). In order to understand the emotion of another person, we need to 
do more than simply recognizing a pattern which allows us to distinguish this pattern from that 
pattern. Being able to distinguish a mere pattern of sadness from a mere pattern of anger does 
not entail that an agent understands what distinguishes the emotion sadness from the emotion 
anger. I thus take it that the understanding of emotions using DSP is a conceptual process where 
concepts are the content of perception. Next, I will tie this together with how we develop a direct 
perception of complex emotions in close relations. 
Finally, I wish to show that we can directly perceive complex emotional states of people we 
know well. In a way, we become experts at recognizing the individuated patterns of emotions 
in close relations.22 Again, I will draw on Wus account of attention to show how we can come 
to recognize these more complex patterns. 
First, prima facie it seems like we can recognize a wider range of emotions in people that we 
are close to, such as spouses, family or friends.23 I will focus the discussion around friendship, 
but my account extends to any close relationship. When seeing a strangers smile, you might 
recognize the basic emotion it expresses (happiness), but you will not be able to distinguish 
that way of smiling from how the person smiles when proud; your pattern recognition is 
QRWÀQHJUDLQHGHQRXJK7KLVLVEHFDXVH\RXDUHQRWIDPLOLDUZLWKWKDWSHUVRQ·Vparticular 
expressions, i.e. how they in particular smile when being happy as opposed to proud. You are 
able, however, to recognize particular ways in which a close friend smiles. You can easily 
distinguish how they smile from being bemused from how they smile from being happy or 
proud. That is, your skill at recognizing their particular expressions has improved. I will show 
how intention-guided attention plays a crucial role in this. 
It could be thought that our pattern recognition improves only in virtue of exposure to the 
friend. This seems like a plausible suggestion since we tend to spend more time with friends 
22  That non-conceptual mindreading is used in family relations is suggested by Newen and Schlicht (2009) in a 
footnote, but there is no further development of this account.
23  To my knowledge, there has not yet been any research on emotion recognition in close relationships, but there is 
UHVHDUFKVKRZLQJWKDWZHDUHEHWWHUDWUHFRJQL]LQJHPRWLRQVLQFXOWXUHVZHDUHPRUHIUHTXHQWO\H[SRVHGWR7KLVÀWV
in well with my account. See Elfenbein and Ambady (2003) and Elfenbein et al. (2007).
4. Directly 
Perceiving 
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than with other people. However, consider the following case. Samira works as a vet. In 
commuting to work, Samira is every day exposed to the same people on the tram. She is thus 
every day exposed to these peoples expressions, and one might think that this is all that is 
needed for her to be able to develop direct perception of their complex emotions. Still, I think 
there is a good reason to think that her pattern recognition and ability to directly perceive 
the emotions of her fellow commuters are restricted in this case, and do not improve further. 
This is, at least in part, because Samira lacks the right intention in these cases.24 As with the 
pine trees, an intention is needed to guide the attention to pick out the patterns relevant 
to a complex emotion. Normally, we do not have the intention to get to know our fellow 
commuters, and therefore our attention is not guided towards improving pattern recognition. 
However, if Samira were particularly interested in a person she saw on the commute every 
day, and had the intention of getting to know them, it is possible that she would come to be 
able to directly perceive some emotional states of that person. It is unlikely that she would 
come to be able to directly perceive many complex emotional states, however, since she is 
only exposed to the person in one context. If she were exposed to the person in more contexts 
 such as during a family dinner, when receiving some good news, when a friend makes an 
unfair remark, etc.  she would likely experience a wider range of that persons emotions. The 
range of emotions expressed by a person during a commute is likely to be smaller since the 
context is somehow monotonous. 
In friendship, on the other hand, we are exposed to the friend in many contexts, and we do 
have the intention to e.g. get to know them better. It is important to note that the intention 
here is not as explicit as to learn to read the facial expressions better, but neither is the 
intention in Wus example of picking up a cup to pick up the cup in the best way possible  
UDWKHUWKHLQWHQWLRQLVMXVW¶WREHDJRRGIULHQG·RU¶WRGULQNIURPWKHFXS·6LQFHSDUWRIZKDW
it means to be a good friend is to be able to respond to the other persons emotional states 
in an appropriate way, intending to be a good friend will guide attention in the right way 
for direct social perception to develop. Since we are exposed to a wide range of emotions in 
FORVHUHODWLRQVZHFDQDOVRFRPHWRGLUHFWO\SHUFHLYHFRPSOH[HPRWLRQVVXFKDVMHDORXV\7KLV
follows directly from my claims about pattern recognition. Basic emotions are individuated 
E\SDWWHUQVWKDWFDQEHUHFRJQL]HGFURVVFXOWXUDOO\ZKHUHDVMHDORXV\PLJKWEHH[SUHVVHG
differently in different people, but crucially in characteristic ways in particular people. Having 
REVHUYHGMHDORXV\LQDIULHQGRQPXOWLSOHRFFDVLRQV,FDQOHDUQWRUHFRJQL]HWKDWSDWWHUQLQWKH
same way as I can recognize happiness in most strangers on the street. We can thus directly 
perceive the basic emotions of most people, but we additionally directly perceive complex 
emotions of people we are close to. 
Finally, once we are able to perceive complex emotions of people we are close to, other 
mindreading strategies become redundant in face-to-face interaction. If I can directly 
perceive that my friend is proud, it is redundant to use another mindreading strategy that 
requires more steps. Since emotions are embodied, the information needed is already there in 
perception. Other mindreading strategies are still needed in close relations in other cases, such 
as if a friend texts me. Since I am not able to directly perceive their emotional state from the 
words I am reading, I will have to resort to another mindreading strategy.25 
24  The case is probably more complicated than as outlined here. The way in which we interact with people we 
DUHFORVHWR²HJKRZZHFRQÀGHLQHDFKRWKHUDQGKRZZHRSHQO\DYRZIHHOLQJVWKDWZHPLJKWRWKHUZLVHNHHSWR
ourselves  could also contribute to the development of direct perception. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for 
pointing this out.
25  This account could be seen as an explanation for why we also feel closer to people that we know well. It seems 
plausible that actually having direct perception of someones mental states might also affect your relationship with 
193
DIRECT SOCIAL PERCEPTION OF EMOTIONS IN CLOSE RELATIONS
In this paper, I provided an account of DSP, which hinges on the ideas of rich perception, 
DWWHQWLRQDQGSDWWHUQUHFRJQLWLRQ,ÀUVWGLVWLQJXLVKHG'63IURPRWKHUDFFRXQWVRIPLQGUHDGLQJ
such as TT and ST, claiming that the main difference between these camps is that DSP is a non-
inferential kind of mindreading. I then argued that emotional expressions partly constitute 
emotional states. For DSP to be a viable theory, we need to be able to perceive emotional states 
by seeing emotional expressions. I supported this by showing that emotional expressions affect 
the phenomenology of emotions. For example, people with Moebius syndrome or people who 
are paralyzed and therefore not able to bodily express their emotions, experience emotions 
differently. Expressions should thus be considered as partly constitutive of emotional states. 
Since we can perceive an entity by perceiving a part of it, I suggested that, by perceiving part 
of an emotion (i.e. its expression), we can perceive the emotion. I then considered the nature 
of perception, and how emotions can be part of perceptual states. Siegel argues that concepts 
feature in our perception, and that there is a contrast between experiencing a pine tree before 
having acquired the concept PINE TREE and experiencing a pine tree after having acquired the 
concept. Certain features of the pine tree become salient to us when we learn the concept, and 
we become able to recognize the pine tree as a pine tree. Similarly, when studying someones face, 
we learn to recognize the patterns that individuate particular emotions. It is necessary both that 
we learn this pattern and that we possess the concept of a particular emotion, such as anger, to 
recognize it as anger. Drawing on studies which show that people with dementia are not able to 
recognize emotions for which they lack a concept, I maintained that the perception of emotions 
is a conceptual process, contra Newen and Schlicht. Finally, I argued that DSP is particularly 
important in close relations. Adopting Wus theory of attention, I showed how we can come to 
recognize complex emotions of people that we are close to by intention-guided attention. In 
virtue of intending to get to know a person better, certain features become salient to us such 
that we are able to recognize these as patterns of complex emotions. Theoretical considerations 
suggest that DSP is particularly important for close relationships, but future empirical research is 
also needed to validate this claim. 
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